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    Carmelics

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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra argues that ultimate truth is not a positively characterizable entity but the absence of inherent existence, making 'Dharmadhātu' a nominalist placeholder rather than a substantive ground.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Candrakīrti identifies Dharmadhātu with śūnyatā itself, suggesting a substantive (if non-intrinsic) nature, not mere nominalism.
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    • 2.Calling śūnyatā a 'placeholder' risks reducing it to linguistic convention, contradicting Candrakīrti's claim that emptiness is ultimately real.
      ?

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    • 3.The negation of inherent existence still posits something determinate—the absence itself—undermining claims of complete non-characterizability.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Candrakīrti explicitly rejects svabhāva (intrinsic nature) as incoherent, making positive characterization of ultimate truth self-refuting.
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    • 2.Dharmadhātu functions pragmatically in his system as a conventional linguistic tool, not a metaphysical entity with independent existence.
      ?

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    • 3.The Madhyamakāvatāra's two-truths framework requires ultimate truth to lack determinate properties to avoid conceptual proliferation.
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