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    Candrakīrti's own use of logical inference to establish c... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Using language at all commits the speaker only to conventional presuppositions, not to metaphysical realities.

    Candrakīrti's own use of logical inference to establish conventionalism is self-undermining: logical laws like non-contradiction appear to be metaphysically necessary, not merely conventional.

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    Reasons For

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    • 1.Non-contradiction appears to hold across all possible contexts, suggesting metaphysical necessity rather than conventional stipulation.
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    • 2.If logical laws were merely conventional, different logical systems could be equally valid, yet we treat violations as genuine errors, not alternatives.
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    • 3.Candrakīrti's arguments depend on logical validity to persuade; this parasitic reliance on logic undermines claims that logic is merely conventional.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Conventionalism about logic doesn't require rejecting logical laws operationally; it only denies they reflect reality-in-itself independent of conceptual frameworks.
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    • 2.Using logical inference pragmatically within conventional discourse doesn't entail endorsing logic as metaphysically necessary—similar to using currency while denying intrinsic value.
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    • 3.The appearance of necessity may reflect cognitive structure or linguistic habit rather than metaphysical fact; necessity and conventionality are not exhaustive alternatives.
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    Key Terms

    Candrakīrti(as the main philosopher being discussed)
    An Indian Buddhist philosopher from around the 600s CE who wrote detailed commentaries on Buddhist logic and metaphysics, particularly focusing on the idea that nothing has a permanent, independent essence.
    Metaphysically necessary(as used in modal metaphysics)
    Something that must be true in all possible ways the world could be; it's not just true in our world but couldn't possibly be false in any imaginable scenario.
    Non-contradiction(as the basic principle dialetheism challenges but classical logic maintains)
    The fundamental rule of classical logic stating that nothing can be both true and false in the same way at the same time (also called the 'law of non-contradiction').
    Self-undermining(in logic and argument)
    When an idea or rule contradicts itself or destroys the very thing it's trying to achieve.
    conventionalism(Philosophy of language debate in Plato's Cratylus)
    The view that the correctness of names is determined by social consent and agreement rather than by natural resemblance or description
    logical inference(Poincaré's critique of logical inference in mathematical proof)
    A topic-neutral inference from proposition p to proposition q, where in Tarski's conception every model of p is a model of q

    Connections

    2 topics

    Philosophy of Language1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    Candrakīrti's arguments depend on logical validity to persuade; this parasitic r...Conventionalism about logic doesn't require rejecting logical laws operationally...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    If logical laws were merely conventional, different logical systems could be equ...
    Non-contradiction appears to hold across all possible contexts, suggesting metap...
    +3 moreShow less
    The appearance of necessity may reflect cognitive structure or linguistic habit ...Using language at all commits the speaker only to conventional presuppositions, ...Using logical inference pragmatically within conventional discourse doesn't enta...