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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Using language at all commits the speaker only to convent... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Using language at all commits the speaker only to conventional presuppositions, not to metaphysical realities.

    Philosophy of LanguageSkepticism
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Language rests on presuppositions about selves and causally arising phenomena.
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    • 2.Those presuppositions are untenable and not grounded in realities.
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    • 3.Language is purely conventional in nature.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Successful reference requires that at least some terms reliably track mind-independent features of reality, as Kripke's causal theory of reference demonstrates.
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    • 2.If language were purely conventional with no metaphysical anchoring, the stability and cross-contextual success of reference to natural kinds would be inexplicable.
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    • 3.Therefore, competent language use commits speakers to more than mere convention—it presupposes causal-metaphysical links between terms and their referents.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Candrakīrti's own use of logical inference to establish conventionalism is self-undermining: logical laws like non-contradiction appear to be metaphysically necessary, not merely conventional.
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    • 2.If the claim that 'language commits us only to conventions' is itself advanced as a substantive truth, it implicitly appeals to a non-conventional fact about the nature of language.
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    • 3.Wilfrid Sellars showed that the 'space of reasons' governing assertion has normative structure that cannot be fully deflated into social convention without vicious regress.
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    Topics

    SkepticismPhilosophy of Language

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    Related

    Candrakīrti's own use of logical inference to establish conventionalism is self-...If language were purely conventional with no metaphysical anchoring, the stabili...If the claim that 'language commits us only to conventions' is itself advanced a...Language is purely conventional in nature.
    +5 moreShow less
    Language rests on presuppositions about selves and causally arising phenomena.Successful reference requires that at least some terms reliably track mind-indep...Therefore, competent language use commits speakers to more than mere convention—...Those presuppositions are untenable and not grounded in realities.Wilfrid Sellars showed that the 'space of reasons' governing assertion has norma...

    Similar

    The Buddha's use of conventional language does not commit the Buddha t...82%Those presuppositions are untenable and not grounded in realities.80%Therefore Hume's fork does not show metaphysical claims about absolute...79%Absolute presuppositions are not propositions in this sense.78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: madhyamaka
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    After showing that there cannot be any intelligible account of the arising of phenomena, Candrakīrti acknowledges that in everyday experience we encounter phenomena coming into being all the time. This leads to a discussion of the two truths. The ultimate truth—that is, truth concerning the highest goal—is that phenomena do not come into being; the conventional transactional truth, on the other hand, is that things do come into being and that their arising is conditioned. This conventional truth
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit