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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Carnap's inductive logic programs collapsed precisely because assigning logical probabilities across metaphysical hypotheses requires substantive commitments that cannot be derived from logic alone.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The claim conflates 'not purely logical' with 'collapsed'—Carnap's program may have evolved or faced technical challenges without vindicating skepticism about all formal inductive methods.
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    • 2.Some probability assignments can be justified by information-theoretic principles or symmetry arguments that are quasi-logical, not requiring external metaphysical commitments.
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    • 3.Modern Bayesian approaches succeed by explicitly acknowledging prior choice as a modeling decision, not pretending logic alone determines them—suggesting the framework survives Carnap's setback.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Carnap's λ-continuum and other probability measures require choosing regularities that favor simplicity, but logic alone cannot justify preferring one measure over another.
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    • 2.Assigning prior probabilities to metaphysical hypotheses (e.g., physicalism vs. dualism) depends on background assumptions about what's 'natural' or 'elegant'—these are not logically derivable.
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    • 3.Carnap explicitly abandoned universal inductive logic by the 1960s, recognizing that different scientific frameworks require different probability assignments based on contextual values.
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