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It is not the case that Carnap's inductive logic programs showed that formalizing similarity-based priors inevitably embeds substantive metaphysical assumptions about natural kinds.
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Reasons For
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1.
All inductive systems embed assumptions; this doesn't prove Carnap's programs failed, only that induction requires framework choices.
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2.
Formalization can make metaphysical commitments *explicit and examinable*, reducing rather than hiding hidden assumptions compared to informal reasoning.
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3.
Carnap pursued multiple formalisms precisely to separate logical structure from empirical content, suggesting he recognized but didn't see this as fatal.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Any similarity metric requires choosing which features matter, presupposing divisions among natural kinds that aren't theory-neutral.
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2.
Carnap's own work on λ-continuum showed that different formalization choices yield incompatible inductive conclusions from identical data.
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3.
Similarity-based priors cannot be derived from logic alone; they smuggle in empirical assumptions about what patterns nature exhibits.
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