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    Chalmers' hard problem demonstrates that no account of re... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Representationalism provides a simple account of entailment relations between qualia-statements in terms of the apparent structure of the objects of experiences.

    Chalmers' hard problem demonstrates that no account of representational or functional structure logically entails facts about phenomenal character.

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    Reasons For

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    • 1.We can conceive of zombies (physically identical beings without consciousness), suggesting consciousness isn't logically entailed by physical facts.
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    • 2.Complete knowledge of neural firing patterns and functional roles leaves the question 'why does this feel like something?' unanswered.
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    • 3.Subjective color experience cannot be deduced from wavelength information alone, revealing a logical gap between structure and phenomenology.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Conceivability of zombies may reflect human cognitive limits, not genuine logical possibility—our imagination can fail about consciousness.
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    • 2.The explanatory gap may arise from confusing epistemic inaccessibility with metaphysical independence; functional description might still necessitate experience.
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    • 3.If phenomenal properties are intrinsic features of information processing itself, they would be entailed by functional structure by definition.
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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPerception1 linked

    Related

    Complete knowledge of neural firing patterns and functional roles leaves the que...Conceivability of zombies may reflect human cognitive limits, not genuine logica...If phenomenal properties are intrinsic features of information processing itself...Representationalism provides a simple account of entailment relations between qu...
    +3 moreShow less
    Subjective color experience cannot be deduced from wavelength information alone,...The explanatory gap may arise from confusing epistemic inaccessibility with meta...We can conceive of zombies (physically identical beings without consciousness), ...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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