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    Representationalism provides a simple account of entailme... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Representationalism provides a simple account of entailment relations between qualia-statements in terms of the apparent structure of the objects of experiences.

    Consciousness & MindPerception
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Under representationalism, qualia-statements are equivalent to statements about how things appear (e.g., 'e has Q_{Rx ∧ Sq(x)}' is equivalent to 'e is an experience of something's looking red and square').
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    • 2.The entailment 'e is an experience of something's looking red and square' entails 'e is an experience of something's looking red' follows clearly from the apparent structure of the represented content.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Chalmers' hard problem demonstrates that no account of representational or functional structure logically entails facts about phenomenal character.
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    • 2.Entailment relations among qualia-statements presuppose that qualia are fully characterized by their representational roles, which begs the question against property dualists.
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    • 3.A 'simple' representationalist account of qualia-entailments thus masks a substantive and contested metaphysical commitment rather than offering a neutral logical analysis.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Qualia-statements can come apart from representational content, as Block's absent qualia cases show functional/representational equivalence without qualitative identity.
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    • 2.If qualia are not reducible to representational content, entailment relations among qualia-statements cannot be explained solely by the structure of represented objects.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

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    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    A 'simple' representationalist account of qualia-entailments thus masks a substa...Chalmers' hard problem demonstrates that no account of representational or funct...Entailment relations among qualia-statements presuppose that qualia are fully ch...If qualia are not reducible to representational content, entailment relations am...
    +3 moreShow less
    Qualia-statements can come apart from representational content, as Block's absen...The entailment 'e is an experience of something's looking red and square' entail...Under representationalism, qualia-statements are equivalent to statements about ...

    Similar

    Representationalism and the sense-datum theory each have simple accoun...90%Under representationalism, qualia-statements are equivalent to stateme...84%The sense-datum theory provides a simple account of entailment relatio...83%Representationalism implies that if two experiences differ in qualia, ...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: qualia-inverted
    View source passageHide passage
    Now notice that there are many entailment relations between qualia-statements—for example, ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Sq(x)}\)’ entails ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx}\)’, and ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Tr(x) \amp By \amp Sq(y)}\)’ entails ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Sq(y)}\)’, and so on. The orthodox representationalist and the sense-datum theorist have simple accounts of these entailments in terms of the structure of the objects of experiences (apparent structure, for the representationalist; actual structure, for
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit