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    Chisholm's self-presenting states show that some mental s... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Conceptual awareness of sensations cannot serve as a nondoxastic foundation that confers justification on beliefs without itself needing justification

    Chisholm's self-presenting states show that some mental states are directly evident precisely because their existence and their appearing are identical, bypassing the need for justifying beliefs.

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    Key Terms

    Chisholm(as a philosopher being cited)
    Roderick Chisholm, an important 20th-century American philosopher who argued for essentialism (the view that things have properties they must have).
    Directly evident(as a quality of certain mental states)
    So obvious and clear that you know it's true immediately, without needing reasons or evidence to back it up.
    Existence and appearing are identical(as the key feature that makes self-presenting states unique)
    The idea that for these special mental states, actually having the experience is exactly the same thing as it seeming to you that you're having it—there's no gap between the reality and how it appears to you.
    Justifying beliefs(as what Chisholm argues these mental states don't need)
    Reasons or evidence that explain why you believe something is true; the logical support that makes a belief reasonable rather than just a guess.

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    Self-presenting states(as the foundation of knowledge in Chisholm's theory)
    Mental experiences or thoughts that make themselves obvious to you just by happening—like feeling pain or seeing red; you don't need outside proof to know they're real because you're directly experiencing them.
    mental states(Herder's theory of mind)
    Conditions consisting in forces that manifest themselves in people's bodily behavior, conceptually tied to corresponding types of bodily behavior but not reducible thereto

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    Conceptual awareness of sensations cannot serve as a nondoxastic foundation that...

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