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    Conceptual awareness of sensations cannot serve as a nond... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
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    Conceptual awareness of sensations cannot serve as a nondoxastic foundation that confers justification on beliefs without itself needing justification

    Perception
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The kind of awareness of sensations that involves the application of concepts just is one's knowledge of one's experiences — that is, one's justified, true, unGettiered appearance belief
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    • 2.A state that is itself a justified belief is not a nondoxastic foundation
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    • 3.A nondoxastic foundation must confer justification on beliefs without itself being in need of justification
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Conceptual awareness of sensations can be non-inferentially justified, constituting a distinct epistemic category between bare sensation and full belief.
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    • 2.Sellars' own account allows that some conceptual episodes are epistemically credentialed by their causal-functional role rather than by further beliefs.
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    • 3.A state that requires no further justificatory inference can still serve as a foundation even if it involves conceptual content, as Pryor's dogmatist position demonstrates.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Chisholm's self-presenting states show that some mental states are directly evident precisely because their existence and their appearing are identical, bypassing the need for justifying beliefs.
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    • 2.If a conceptual awareness of a sensation is self-presenting in Chisholm's sense, its justificatory status is intrinsic and does not depend on further doxastic support, preserving its foundational role.
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    Perception

    Related

    A nondoxastic foundation must confer justification on beliefs without itself bei...A state that is itself a justified belief is not a nondoxastic foundationA state that requires no further justificatory inference can still serve as a fo...Chisholm's self-presenting states show that some mental states are directly evid...
    +4 moreShow less
    Conceptual awareness of sensations can be non-inferentially justified, constitut...If a conceptual awareness of a sensation is self-presenting in Chisholm's sense,...Sellars' own account allows that some conceptual episodes are epistemically cred...The kind of awareness of sensations that involves the application of concepts ju...

    Similar

    Conceptual awareness of sensations is itself a justified doxastic stat...88%Non-conceptual awareness of sensations cannot account for the justific...87%Non-conceptual awareness of sensations does not account for the justif...87%A nondoxastic foundation must confer justification on beliefs without ...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: perception-episprob
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    Perhaps the most important problem for this view concerns the relevant understanding of seemings, or perceptual experience. It is clear that seemings must be non-belief states of some sort, as their epistemological role is to confer justification on basic beliefs, and the latter wouldn’t be basic if seemings were themselves beliefs. The “Sellarsian dilemma” is a famous argument, due perhaps as much to BonJour (1978, 1985) as to Sellars (1956), which claims that “experience” and “seemings” and th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit