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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Cognition can arise from internal mental representations (vijñaptis) without any external object causing them, as Vasubandhu argues in the Viṃśatikā.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Dreams differ from waking cognition; representing them equally undermines empirical knowledge's reliability.
      ?

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    • 2.Internal representations require prior causal contact with external objects to develop meaningful content.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Vijñaptimātratā cannot explain inter-subjective agreement or causal constraints on perception without external reality.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Dreams and hallucinations demonstrate cognition occurring without external objects, supporting representationalism.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mental representations can be causally sufficient for experience; external objects are epistemically inaccessible anyway.
      ?

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    • 3.Vasubandhu's idealism coherently explains why all experience is phenomenologically structured by mind.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.