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    Coincident entities like Lumpl and Goliath share all the ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Extensional Mereology's principle that identity follows from sameness of parts (principle P.5 and its consequence principle 27) is too strong and imposes an incorrect constraint on the parthood relation.

    Coincident entities like Lumpl and Goliath share all the same parts yet are numerically distinct objects with different modal properties.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Objects can have different modal properties (Lumpl could survive flattening; Goliath couldn't) without differing in intrinsic physical composition.
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    • 2.Identity conditions can depend on sortal concepts (lump vs. statue) even when material composition is identical at any given time.
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    • 3.Our practices of counting distinct kinds in ontology suggest material coincidence without identity reflects genuine metaphysical structure.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If two objects share all parts and spatiotemporal location, Leibniz's Law (indiscernibles are identical) entails they are one object.
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    • 2.Modal properties allegedly differing between Lumpl and Goliath reflect only different concepts applied to one thing, not distinct entities.
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    • 3.Positing coincident entities multiplies objects beyond necessity without empirical or logical grounds, violating parsimony principles.
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    Related

    Extensional Mereology's principle that identity follows from sameness of parts (...Identity conditions can depend on sortal concepts (lump vs. statue) even when ma...If two objects share all parts and spatiotemporal location, Leibniz's Law (indis...Modal properties allegedly differing between Lumpl and Goliath reflect only diff...
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    Objects can have different modal properties (Lumpl could survive flattening; Gol...Our practices of counting distinct kinds in ontology suggest material coincidenc...Positing coincident entities multiplies objects beyond necessity without empiric...

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    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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