Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Extensional Mereology's principle that identity follows f... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Extensional Mereology's principle that identity follows from sameness of parts (principle P.5 and its consequence principle 27) is too strong and imposes an incorrect constraint on the parthood relation.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Coincident entities like Lumpl and Goliath share all the same parts yet are numerically distinct objects with different modal properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If distinct objects can share all parts, then part-identity (P.5) fails as a general metaphysical principle governing the parthood relation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Kit Fine's and Kathleen Koslicki's hylomorphic frameworks demonstrate that constitution without identity is coherent and well-grounded in the literature.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Four-dimensionalist perdurance theory requires temporal stages, making the same persisting object composable from different part-slices at different times.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If a persisting object can survive mereological change across time, then sameness of parts across temporal stages cannot be necessary for identity, refuting P.5's universality.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.David Lewis's and Theodore Sider's stage-theoretic accounts explicitly commit to objects having non-identical part-sets at different times while remaining self-identical.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Principle (27) follows from principle (P.5) of Extensional Mereology.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Sameness of proper parts is not sufficient for identity (established by the argument from word/tune/arrangement/group/cat-tissue cases).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Sameness of proper parts is not necessary for identity (established by the argument from mereological change survival).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Modality & Possibility

    Key Terms

    Extensional mereology(Formal mereology, Goodman (1951))
    A mereological system in which overlap ('O') can serve as a primitive from which parthood ('P') is defined, and in which objects with the same parts are identical
    Mereology
    The study of the relations between parts and wholes
    Parthood relation(what the statement claims is being incorrectly constrained)
    The logical relationship between a part and a whole—like how a wheel is part of a car, or how individual atoms are parts of a molecule.
    Principle (philosophical)(refers to principles P.5 and 27, which are formal rules in the system)
    A fundamental rule or law that serves as the foundation for reasoning or understanding how something works.
    identity (in philosophy)(whether the trees are actually identical)
    Sameness or whether two things are actually the same thing, not just very similar.

    Related

    Coincident entities like Lumpl and Goliath share all the same parts yet are nume...David Lewis's and Theodore Sider's stage-theoretic accounts explicitly commit to...Four-dimensionalist perdurance theory requires temporal stages, making the same ...If a persisting object can survive mereological change across time, then samenes...
    +6 moreShow less
    If distinct objects can share all parts, then part-identity (P.5) fails as a gen...If either of these arguments is accepted, then principle (27) is too strong a pr...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: mereology
    View source passageHide passage
    Two sorts of reason are worth examining. On the one hand, it is sometimes argued that sameness of proper parts is not sufficient for identity. For example, it is argued that: (i) two words can be made up of the same letters (Hempel 1953: 110; Rescher 1955: 10), two tunes of the same notes (Rosen and Dorr 2002: 154), and so on; or (ii) the same flowers can compose a nice bunch or a scattered bundle, depending on the arrangements of the individual flowers (Eberle 1970: §2.10); or (iii) two groups
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Kit Fine's and Kathleen Koslicki's hylomorphic frameworks demonstrate that const...
    Principle (27) follows from principle (P.5) of Extensional Mereology.
    Sameness of proper parts is not necessary for identity (established by the argum...
    Sameness of proper parts is not sufficient for identity (established by the argu...

    Similar

    If either of these arguments is accepted, then principle (27) is too s...83%The Kripkean argument conflicts with the common sense principle that r...81%Sameness of proper parts is not necessary for identity (established by...79%By ND (the necessity of distinctness/identity principle), it follows t...78%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit