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    Compatibilist judgments are not distorted by emotional re... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Compatibilist judgments are not distorted by emotional reactions

    Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe's 2007 research demonstrated that concrete emotional scenarios elicit incompatibilist intuitions, not compatibilist ones.
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    • 2.If emotions systematically drove moral responsibility judgments, we would expect emotional vignettes to boost compatibilist responses, but the evidence shows the opposite pattern.
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    • 3.Compatibilist judgments therefore track abstract reasoning about control and reasons-responsiveness, not affective arousal.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.John Martin Fischer's reasons-responsiveness framework grounds compatibilist judgments in cognitive assessments of an agent's capacity to respond to reasons.
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    • 2.Cognitive assessments of reasons-responsiveness are structurally distinct from emotional reactions, which are triggered by harm salience and victim identification.
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    • 3.Experimental results showing compatibilist judgments remain stable across high- and low-emotion conditions confirm they derive from this deliberative, reasons-based evaluation.
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    Reasons Against

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    • A meta-analysis of experimental philosophy studies found very little evidence that emotions play a critical role in generating compatibilist judgments
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Related

    A meta-analysis of experimental philosophy studies found very little evidence th...Cognitive assessments of reasons-responsiveness are structurally distinct from e...Compatibilist judgments therefore track abstract reasoning about control and rea...Experimental results showing compatibilist judgments remain stable across high- ...
    +3 moreShow less
    If emotions systematically drove moral responsibility judgments, we would expect...John Martin Fischer's reasons-responsiveness framework grounds compatibilist jud...Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe's 2007 research demonstrated that concrete emotio...

    Similar

    Moral judgments are grounded in sentiment, not reason.82%Reactive emotions change the meaning of the judgment.80%Moral judgments are not merely statements of a psychological state (su...78%Reactive emotions are not superfluous add-ons to the judgment involved...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: experimental-philosophy
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    Thus, there is some reason to think that incompatibilist responses do reflect many people’s intuitions. What about the compatibilist responses? Some experimental philosophers maintain that it is these judgments that are distorted. On one view, the distortion is caused by emotional reactions (e.g., Nichols & Knobe 2007). However, a meta-analysis indicates that there is very little evidence that emotions play a critical role in generating compatibilist judgments (Feltz & Cova 2014). A diff
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit