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    Complete crowding out would destroy intentional directedn... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Two representations can completely crowd out a third representation, rendering it incapable of affecting the state of mind.

    Complete crowding out would destroy intentional directedness itself, yet Brentano's phenomenological evidence shows occluded representations retain dispositional intentional character.

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    Key Terms

    Brentano(the philosopher whose hypothesis is being discussed)
    Franz Brentano was a 19th-century philosopher who argued that consciousness is the defining feature of mental states—basically, that what makes something a thought or feeling is that it's about something and we're aware of it.
    Crowding out(in philosophy of mind)
    When one thing takes up so much space or attention that it completely eliminates or prevents something else from existing or functioning.
    Dispositional intentional character(in philosophy of mind)
    The ability of a mental state to be *about* something even when it's not actively being thought about—like how a belief you're not currently thinking about still counts as a belief.
    Intentional directedness(central concept in philosophy of mind)
    The idea that our thoughts, feelings, and perceptions are always *about* something—they point toward or aim at an object outside the mind.

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    Occluded representations(in philosophy of mind)
    Mental representations or ideas that are hidden, blocked, or not directly accessible to conscious awareness, even though they might still be operating in the background.
    Phenomenological evidence(in philosophy of mind and phenomenology)
    Information or observations about how things actually appear to us in our direct, lived experience—what it's like from the inside when we think, perceive, or feel something.

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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPerception1 linked

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    Two representations can completely crowd out a third representation, rendering i...

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