Conee and Feldman's evidentialist framework shows that acquaintance-based probability relations face the same generality problem as phenomenal states: which relation, under which individuation, counts?
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(First articulated as a problem for process reliabilism; virtue epistemology faces its own version)
The problem that any episode of belief acquisition can be classified under an indefinite number of type descriptions, some of which individuate reliable dispositions and some of which do not, making it unclear which classification is the relevant one for epistemic evaluation
individuation(Scholastic debate over the principle of individuation)
The metaphysical explanation of what makes a particular thing a distinct individual rather than a universal or shared nature
phenomenal states(authors' interpretation of Siewert's identification of phenomenal character)
states of things seeming a certain way, where the relevant kind of seeming is the kind familiar from perceptual cases where things look a certain way