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    Conflating reliable prediction with sufficient grounding ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→An agent can form an intention of the form 'I intend that we X' without requiring certainty about the partner's intentions.

    Conflating reliable prediction with sufficient grounding for intention collapses the distinction between intending and expecting, undermining the normative role intentions play in practical reasoning.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Intentions are action-guiding commitments that bind agents normatively; mere predictions lack this prescriptive force over future conduct.
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    • 2.If prediction sufficed for intention, an agent could intend outcomes they refuse to actively pursue, contradicting intention's constitutive role.
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    • 3.Practical reasoning requires distinguishing what I will reliably do from what I commit to doing, else deliberation becomes epiphenomenal.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Reliable predictions about behavior are often grounded in prior commitments; collapsing them may simply reflect their actual dependence.
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    • 2.The normative force of intentions derives from their causal role in producing action, not from a metaphysical difference from predictions.
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    • 3.Practical reasoning distinguishes intentions from mere expectations through their role in planning and coordination, not through logical separation.
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    Key Terms

    Conflating
    Conflating means mixing together or treating two different things as if they were the same thing, when they're actually distinct. It's a logical error where someone blurs important differences between concepts, ideas, or situations to make an argument seem stronger than it is. For example, conflating "being critical of a policy" with "being disloyal to your country" wrongly equates two separate things.
    Expecting(as used in philosophy of mind)
    Believing that something will probably happen, without necessarily deciding to make it happen.
    Reliable prediction(as used in epistemology (the study of knowledge))
    Being able to accurately guess what will happen in the future based on patterns or evidence.
    Sufficient grounding(as used in logic and philosophy of knowledge)
    Having enough solid reasons or evidence to justify something as true or valid.
    intention(as used in philosophy of language)
    A deliberate plan or purpose that someone has in mind when they do something.
    normative role(Eklund's proposed basis for fixing the reference of normative terms)
    Roughly, the practical role played by normative predicates in our deliberations about what to do.
    practical reasoning(Central to the full attribution of intentional agency)
    The capacity to treat the contents of mental attitudes as premises in reasoning that leads to action

    Connections

    2 topics

    Philosophy of Language1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    An agent can form an intention of the form 'I intend that we X' without requirin...If prediction sufficed for intention, an agent could intend outcomes they refuse...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Intentions are action-guiding commitments that bind agents normatively; mere pre...
    Practical reasoning distinguishes intentions from mere expectations through thei...
    +3 moreShow less
    Practical reasoning requires distinguishing what I will reliably do from what I ...Reliable predictions about behavior are often grounded in prior commitments; col...The normative force of intentions derives from their causal role in producing ac...