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    Made withinDC&Austin
    An agent can form an intention of the form 'I intend that... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    An agent can form an intention of the form 'I intend that we X' without requiring certainty about the partner's intentions.

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.An agent forming the intention 'I intend that we X' does so under the assumption that the partner does or will come to intend likewise.
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    • 2.An agent is typically in a position to reliably predict whether the other will come to form a corresponding intention.
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    • 3.Reliable prediction is sufficient to ground the intention without requiring certainty.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Bratman's planning theory requires that intentions be action-guiding in ways that presuppose commitments from all relevant agents, not merely probabilistic forecasts.
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    • 2.An intention directed at a joint outcome ('we X') that lacks assurance of the partner's reciprocal commitment is merely a wish or hope, not a genuine intention in Bratman's technical sense.
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    • 3.Conflating reliable prediction with sufficient grounding for intention collapses the distinction between intending and expecting, undermining the normative role intentions play in practical reasoning.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Searle's account of collective intentionality holds that 'I intend that we X' is only coherent as a genuine we-intention when it is already embedded in a pre-reflective sense of shared agency, not derivable from individual predictive reasoning.
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    • 2.If the intention's validity depended solely on one agent's predictive confidence about the other, it would reduce collective intention to a conjunction of individual intentions, which Searle explicitly identifies as a reductive fallacy.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge2 linked

    Related

    An agent forming the intention 'I intend that we X' does so under the assumption...An agent is typically in a position to reliably predict whether the other will c...An intention directed at a joint outcome ('we X') that lacks assurance of the pa...Bratman's planning theory requires that intentions be action-guiding in ways tha...
    +4 moreShow less
    Conflating reliable prediction with sufficient grounding for intention collapses...If the intention's validity depended solely on one agent's predictive confidence...Reliable prediction is sufficient to ground the intention without requiring cert...Searle's account of collective intentionality holds that 'I intend that we X' is...

    Similar

    Both agents form intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' under the...95%An agent forming the intention 'I intend that we X' does so under the ...94%Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to...84%Each agent's intention is partially constitutive of the shared intenti...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: collective-intentionality
    View source passageHide passage
    Thus, the claim here is that intentions of the form “I intend that we X” are basic to the intentionality of joint action. Critics have argued that Bratman’s account is defective in so far as it treats intentions of that form as basic, since they violate either (1) the condition that one can only intend one’s own action, or (2) the condition that one can only control one’s own and no other agent’s actions, or (3) the condition that one can only intend what one can take to be in a position to sett
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit