Construing the characteristically mental properties of experiences as neither physical nor mental causes the identity theory to lose what is distinctively mental

Consciousness & Mind Philosophy of Language

?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

0 reasons for

1 reason against

Reasons Against

1 perspective

Reason against

1.Experiences have characteristically mental properties
?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.A topic-neutral construal treats those properties as neither physical nor mental
?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.Treating those properties as neither physical nor mental eliminates what is distinctively mental about them
?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

Next step

Based on where you are in your exploration

Strongest counterpoint

Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

Source

AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid

SEP: mind-identity

View source passage

Quoting these passages, David Chalmers (1996, p. 360) objects that if ‘something is going on’ is construed broadly enough it is inadequate, and if it is construed narrowly enough to cover only experiential states (or processes) it is not sufficient for the conclusion. Smart would counter this by stressing the word ‘typically’. Of course a lot of things go on in me when I have a yellow after image (for example my heart is pumping blood through my brain). However they do not typically go on then:

Extraction notes

Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 1 (0 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit