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    An identity theorist finds no trouble with the ordinary, ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The identity theorist need not use the word 'mental' in the topic-neutral formula

    An identity theorist finds no trouble with the ordinary, non-theoretical uses of 'mental'

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

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    The identity theorist need not use the word 'mental' in the topic-neutral formul...The word 'mental' in ordinary usage is a grab-bag term covering heterogeneous ca...To be topic-neutral is to be applicable to both physical and mental domains, as ...

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    The identity theorist need not use the word 'mental' in the topic-neut...90%The mind-brain identity theory can be established without relying on p...84%Construing the characteristically mental properties of experiences as ...83%Dualistic theories and mind-brain identity theories do not tie mental ...81%

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    Quoting these passages, David Chalmers (1996, p. 360) objects that if ‘something is going on’ is construed broadly enough it is inadequate, and if it is construed narrowly enough to cover only experiential states (or processes) it is not sufficient for the conclusion. Smart would counter this by stressing the word ‘typically’. Of course a lot of things go on in me when I have a yellow after image (for example my heart is pumping blood through my brain). However they do not typically go on then:

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