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    Containing a multiplicity of Forms entails not being simple. — Carmelics
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    Home/Divine Attributes
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    Supports→The second god is not simple, because the second god contains the Forms of all entities.

    Containing a multiplicity of Forms entails not being simple.

    Divine AttributesModality & Possibility
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    Divine AttributesModality & Possibility

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    Trinity1 linkedNatural Theology

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    The demiurge encompasses all Forms within itself, on the basis of Timaeus 39e7-9...The second god is not simple, because the second god contains the Forms of all e...

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    Affirming a multiplicity of Dalmatians requires accepting that all but...81%In Γ2, every point appears in a multiplicity of triples.78%D1 and D8, taken together, yield the result that the one must be both ...78%The Form F is many (having many parts)77%

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    SEP: numenius
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    Numenius faces two challenges. First, how can the first God be the ultimate cause of everything, as it appears it ought to be (fr. 16.1–2, 9), if it is inert? Second how can it be simple, as Numenius has claimed, if it is, as he has also claimed, an intellect that thinks? Numenius maintains that the first or highest God, or first intellect, brings about a second one (frs. 13, 21.7), in fact the divine demiurge, and uses this second intellect as an instrument of its thinking (fr. 22.1–2). It is

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