Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Cornell realist attempts to identify moral properties wit... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Naturalist moral epistemology fails to derive moral conclusions from purely non-normative premises

    Cornell realist attempts to identify moral properties with natural properties fail because, as Parfit argues in 'On What Matters,' such identifications smuggle in prior normative commitments about which natural properties matter morally.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Key Terms

    'On What Matters'(as a philosophical work)
    A major book by Derek Parfit that argues for a specific view about what makes things morally important and why.
    Cornell realism(metaethics)
    A version of naturalistic realism holding that moral properties exist and are identical to natural properties
    Derek Parfit(as a philosopher being cited for his theory on personal identity)
    A highly influential philosopher who argued that personal identity (what makes you 'you' over time) is less important than we think, and that we're not the unified, continuous selves we assume we are.
    identify with / identification(in philosophical argument)
    Claiming that two different things are actually the same thing—like saying 'water is H₂O' identifies water with a chemical compound.
    moral properties

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Explore a random proposition
    Start fresh with something unrelated.
    (Disputed between non-cognitivists (who deny or remain silent on their existence) and their critics)
    Properties such as badness, goodness, or evil that events or states of affairs may possess, and in virtue of which those events are bad, good, or evil
    natural properties(Used to contrast with moral properties in both Kant's and Moore's arguments)
    Properties that are known through experience (empirically accessible properties)
    normative commitments(as used in philosophy of science)
    When a theory takes a stance on how things *should* be or what *ought* to happen, rather than just describing how things actually are.
    smuggle in(as a way of describing hidden assumptions)
    To introduce an idea or assumption into an argument without openly stating it or proving it deserves to be there.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Skepticism1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    Naturalist moral epistemology fails to derive moral conclusions from purely non-...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective