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    Naturalist moral epistemology fails to derive moral concl... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Naturalist moral epistemology fails to derive moral conclusions from purely non-normative premises

    Moral ResponsibilitySkepticism
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Hume's guillotine establishes that 'is' statements cannot logically entail 'ought' statements without an irreducible normative bridge principle.
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    • 2.Every proposed naturalist bridge principle (e.g., 'what promotes flourishing ought to be done') reintroduces normative content, making the derivation circular.
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    • 3.G.E. Moore's open question argument shows that for any natural property F, 'X is F but is X good?' remains coherently askable, proving no purely descriptive predicate captures moral content.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Cornell realist attempts to identify moral properties with natural properties fail because, as Parfit argues in 'On What Matters,' such identifications smuggle in prior normative commitments about which natural properties matter morally.
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    • 2.Any selectivity about which non-normative facts ground moral conclusions presupposes a normative ranking criterion that cannot itself be derived from non-normative premises.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Naturalists attempt to derive that an act is morally wrong from purely non-normative features of the act
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    • 2.Any such derivation depends on a suppressed premise that all acts with those non-normative features are morally wrong
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    • 3.The suppressed premise is itself a moral (normative) claim
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilitySkepticism

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language2 linked

    Related

    Any selectivity about which non-normative facts ground moral conclusions presupp...Any such derivation depends on a suppressed premise that all acts with those non...Cornell realist attempts to identify moral properties with natural properties fa...Every proposed naturalist bridge principle (e.g., 'what promotes flourishing oug...
    +4 moreShow less
    G.E. Moore's open question argument shows that for any natural property F, 'X is...Hume's guillotine establishes that 'is' statements cannot logically entail 'ough...Naturalists attempt to derive that an act is morally wrong from purely non-norma...The suppressed premise is itself a moral (normative) claim

    Similar

    Modern moral theory holds that there is a fact-value distinction that ...85%The rules of morality are not conclusions of reason83%Fundamental moral principles cannot be arrived at through reasoning, a...82%Naturalized epistemology does not share this explicit normative aim81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: skepticism-moral
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    Naturalists in moral epistemology deny (5) when they try to derive a conclusion that an act is morally wrong from purely non-normative features of the act. However, moral skeptics retort that such derivations always depend on a suppressed premise that all acts with those features are morally wrong. Such a suppressed premise seems moral and, hence, normative. If so, the naturalist’s inference does not really work without any normative premises. Naturalists still might invoke inferences to the bes
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit