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    Currie and Ravenscroft's distinction between recreative a... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Simulation Theorists are justified in considering imagining believing to be a high-level simulation process.

    Currie and Ravenscroft's distinction between recreative and enactive imagination shows that phenomenological mimicry of belief falls short of simulation in the relevant sense.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Recreative imagination involves mere phenomenological rehearsal of content without engaging the cognitive mechanisms that generate beliefs.
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    • 2.Enactive imagination requires actively constructing counterfactual scenarios using belief-formation processes, not just mimicking their phenomenology.
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    • 3.True simulation demands functional isomorphism with target cognitive states, which phenomenological mimicry alone cannot provide.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.The recreative/enactive distinction may conflate epistemic access with functional difference—both could achieve simulation via different routes.
      ?

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    • 2.Phenomenological mimicry of belief involves deploying actual inferential capacities, making it functionally equivalent to limited simulation.
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    • 3.Currie and Ravenscroft's threshold for 'relevant sense' of simulation may be artificially stringent and question-begging.
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    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Currie and Ravenscroft's threshold for 'relevant sense' of simulation may be art...Enactive imagination requires actively constructing counterfactual scenarios usi...Phenomenological mimicry of belief involves deploying actual inferential capacit...Recreative imagination involves mere phenomenological rehearsal of content witho...
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    Simulation Theorists are justified in considering imagining believing to be a hi...The recreative/enactive distinction may conflate epistemic access with functiona...True simulation demands functional isomorphism with target cognitive states, whi...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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