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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Simulation Theorists are justified in considering imagini... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Simulation Theorists are justified in considering imagining believing to be a high-level simulation process.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Imagining believing satisfies condition (a).
      ?

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    • 2.Imagining believing satisfies condition (b.i).
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    • 3.Imagining believing satisfies condition (b.ii) in that it is implemented by reuse of the belief-forming mechanism.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Reusing a belief-forming mechanism does not constitute simulation of belief unless the outputs are functionally isomorphic to actual beliefs.
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    • 2.Nichols and Stich's own quarantine hypothesis shows imagined beliefs are inferentially isolated, violating functional isomorphism with real beliefs.
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    • 3.A process that systematically lacks the inferential integration of belief cannot be classified as a high-level simulation of believing.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Satisfying necessary conditions (a) and (b) does not establish that imaginative belief-states are genuinely doxastic simulations rather than mere pretense states.
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    • 2.Currie and Ravenscroft's distinction between recreative and enactive imagination shows that phenomenological mimicry of belief falls short of simulation in the relevant sense.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    A process that systematically lacks the inferential integration of belief cannot...Currie and Ravenscroft's distinction between recreative and enactive imagination...Imagining believing satisfies condition (a).Imagining believing satisfies condition (b.i).
    +5 moreShow less
    Imagining believing satisfies condition (b.ii) in that it is implemented by reus...Nichols and Stich's own quarantine hypothesis shows imagined beliefs are inferen...Reusing a belief-forming mechanism does not constitute simulation of belief unle...Satisfying necessary conditions (a) and (b) does not establish that imaginative ...There is no evidence to the contrary.

    Similar

    Mental simulation events are not events of judging that someone else h...79%A human being simulating another human being need only reuse her own c...78%The Systems Reply fails to account for the distinction between simulat...77%The Chinese Room simulation as a whole may come to understand Chinese ...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: folkpsych-simulation
    View source passageHide passage
    What about (b.ii)? Direct evidence bearing on it is scarce. However, Simulation Theorists can give an argument along the following lines. First, one owes an explanation of why belief-like imaginings are, well, belief-like—as we have said above, it seems that they have the same type of content as, and a functional role similar to, genuine beliefs. A possible explanation for this is that both types of mental states are generated by (cognitive processes implemented by) the same cognitive mechanism.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit