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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that David Lewis's counterpart theory and Haecceitism debates show that world-level isomorphism and individual-level property preservation can come apart depending on one's theory of trans-world identity.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If counterpart theory makes trans-world identity conventional (via the counterpart relation), it's unclear why any particular assignment of counterparts should count as correct.
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    • 2.Haecceitism's appeal to primitive 'thisness' beyond qualitative properties makes it epistemically inaccessible and explanatorily idle compared to structural identity criteria.
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    • 3.The claim that isomorphism and property-preservation can diverge assumes worlds are abstract objects, but if they're concrete particulars, the distinction collapses.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Counterpart theory preserves intuitions about rigid designation by allowing distinct counterparts in different worlds to share qualitative properties.
      ?

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    • 2.Haecceitism correctly identifies that world-isomorphism doesn't entail identity preservation, since two worlds could be structurally identical yet contain numerically distinct individuals.
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    • 3.Lewis's framework explains why 'I could have been someone else' seems true intuitively: the counterpart relation is contingent, not determined by world-structure alone.
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