David Lewis's modalrealism and Hume's denial of necessary connections between distinct existences jointly entail that explanatory relations are not modally transferable via world-identity arguments.
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Able to carry over or remain the same when we move from one possible world to another.
Necessary connections(as used in logic and metaphysics)
Relationships between things where one must follow from the other—you can't have one without the other, like you can't have a triangle without having three sides.
World-identity arguments(the method of transfer being challenged)
A type of logical reasoning that claims something is true in one possible world because it's identical to something in another possible world.
modal realism(Distinguished from views treating possible worlds as abstract objects)
Lewis's philosophical thesis concerning the nature of possible worlds, specifically his 'form' of it which holds other possible worlds are concrete entities (concreta)