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    There is something (some proposition q) that explains the... — Carmelics
    Home/Natural Theology
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    There is something (some proposition q) that explains the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF) of the actual world.

    Natural Theology
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.It is possible that the BCCF of the actual world (p) has an explanation; that is, there is a possible world W1 that contains p, q, and the proposition that q explains p.
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    • 2.Since W1 contains p, every conjunct of p in the actual world W is also a conjunct of the BCCF of W1, so no property of p is absent from W1.
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    • 3.If r is a conjunct of p in W, then not-r cannot be a conjunct of p1 (the BCCF of W1) in W1.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.The inference from W1's containing p to W1 being identical to the actual world illicitly assumes that shared contingent facts exhaust world-individuation.
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    • 2.Two distinct possible worlds can share all the same contingent facts while differing in which explanatory relations obtain between propositions.
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    • 3.Therefore P4 fails: W1 could contain q and the explaining relation without being numerically identical to the actual world.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.The Weak PSR licenses only that explanation is possible for the BCCF, not that the same explainer q exists across all worlds where p obtains.
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    • 2.David Lewis's modal realism and Hume's denial of necessary connections between distinct existences jointly entail that explanatory relations are not modally transferable via world-identity arguments.
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    • 3.Therefore the modal collapse from 'possibly explained' to 'actually explained' requires a stronger PSR than Gale and Pruss's weak version can legitimately supply.
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    Topics

    Natural Theology

    Related

    David Lewis's modal realism and Hume's denial of necessary connections between d...If r is a conjunct of p in W, then not-r cannot be a conjunct of p1 (the BCCF of...It is possible that the BCCF of the actual world (p) has an explanation; that is...Since W and W1 have the same properties, W1 is identical to the actual world.
    +7 moreShow less
    Since W1 contains p, every conjunct of p in the actual world W is also a conjunc...The Weak PSR licenses only that explanation is possible for the BCCF, not that t...The inference from W1's containing p to W1 being identical to the actual world i...Therefore P4 fails: W1 could contain q and the explaining relation without being...Therefore the actual world contains p, q, and the proposition that q explains p.Therefore the modal collapse from 'possibly explained' to 'actually explained' r...Two distinct possible worlds can share all the same contingent facts while diffe...

    Similar

    It is possible that the BCCF of the actual world (p) has an explanatio...83%Therefore the actual world contains p, q, and the proposition that q e...81%There is a definite answer to the question 'Why is there something rat...78%Synderesis provides human beings with insight into God's intentions an...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted3/3 agreementValid
    SEP: cosmological-argument
    Gale and Pruss's argument via weak PSR
    View source passageHide passage
    If one grants modal Axiom S5 (if it is possible that it is necessary that \(p\), then it is necessary that \(p\)), the critical premise in the argument is the second, and Gale and Pruss proceed to defend it using their weak PSR. They begin with the notion of a Big Conjunctive Fact (BCF), which is the totality of propositions that would be true of any possible world were it actualized. Since all possible worlds would have the same necessary propositions, they are differentiated by their Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF), which would contain different contingent propositions. Let \(p\) be t...
    Extraction notes

    Validity: The extracted argument accurately captures the chain of reasoning presented in the source passage, where Gale argues from the possibility of an explanation of the BCCF through the identity of W1 with the actual world to the conclusion that the BCCF of the actual world actually has an explanation.

    Confidence: High confidence; the reasoning chain is explicitly laid out in the text.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit