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    Davidson has not established that strict laws (as opposed... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Davidson has not provided adequate argument for the cause-law principle

    Davidson has not established that strict laws (as opposed to ceteris paribus laws) are required for the dispositional vocabulary to operate as it does

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    Davidson has not provided adequate argument for the cause-law principleWithout that establishment, the rationale for the cause-law principle is missing

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    Therefore, mental concepts cannot figure in strict laws.77%

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    Indeterministic causation is inconsistent with the requirement of stri...73%
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    A related line of argument that Davidson offers (see 4.3) appears to suggest that dispositional predicates—those defined in terms of the effects they tend to bring about—are not suitable for inclusion in strict laws (generalizations in which they figure are always qualified by a ceteris paribus clause), but there must be strict laws at the bottom, so to speak, of the dispositional vocabulary. Davidson’s discussion of this issue refers back to an older debate about the status of dispositional t

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