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    Davidson has not provided adequate argument for the cause... — Carmelics
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    Davidson has not provided adequate argument for the cause-law principle

    Causation
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Hume's regularity theory, which Davidson implicitly relies on, entails that causation requires exceptionless regularities, but this is contested by singularist accounts (Ducasse, Anscombe).
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    • 2.Anscombe's 1971 'Causality and Determination' demonstrates that singular causal relations are ontologically primitive and do not require subsumption under laws.
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    • 3.If singular causation is intelligible without laws, Davidson's cause-law principle lacks the metaphysical foundation needed to generate the anomalism of the mental.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Cartwright's work on ceteris paribus laws shows that even physics employs only hedged, idealized laws rather than the exceptionless strict laws Davidson requires.
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    • 2.If strict deterministic laws are unavailable even in paradigmatically physical domains, Davidson cannot coherently privilege them as the criterion distinguishing genuine causal explanation.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Davidson has not established that strict laws (as opposed to ceteris paribus laws) are required for the dispositional vocabulary to operate as it does
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    • 2.Without that establishment, the rationale for the cause-law principle is missing
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    Causation

    Related

    Anscombe's 1971 'Causality and Determination' demonstrates that singular causal ...Cartwright's work on ceteris paribus laws shows that even physics employs only h...Davidson has not established that strict laws (as opposed to ceteris paribus law...Hume's regularity theory, which Davidson implicitly relies on, entails that caus...
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    If singular causation is intelligible without laws, Davidson's cause-law princip...If strict deterministic laws are unavailable even in paradigmatically physical d...Without that establishment, the rationale for the cause-law principle is missing

    Similar

    Without that establishment, the rationale for the cause-law principle ...86%The cause-law principle holds that causes must instantiate strict laws83%Davidson's argument from predicate-individuation and change does not c...82%The cause-law principle is false because quantum mechanics shows causa...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: anomalous-monism
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    A related line of argument that Davidson offers (see 4.3) appears to suggest that dispositional predicates—those defined in terms of the effects they tend to bring about—are not suitable for inclusion in strict laws (generalizations in which they figure are always qualified by a ceteris paribus clause), but there must be strict laws at the bottom, so to speak, of the dispositional vocabulary. Davidson’s discussion of this issue refers back to an older debate about the status of dispositional t
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit