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    Davidson's own argument in 'Mental Events' moves from cau... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Davidson's anomalous monism cannot move from 'mental events must instantiate non-mental strict law properties' to 'those properties must be physical' without assuming causal closure of the physical

    Davidson's own argument in 'Mental Events' moves from causal interaction to strict law instantiation without providing resources to exclude non-physical strict laws.

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    Reasons For

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    • 1.Davidson's causal argument only establishes that mental events cause physical effects, not that they instantiate physical laws.
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    • 2.Non-reductive physicalism permits strict psychophysical laws governing mental-to-mental causation without physical law instantiation.
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    • 3.Davidson never explicitly argues why causal efficacy requires events to fall under physical laws rather than autonomous mental laws.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Davidson's exclusion argument assumes causal closure: if mental events cause physical events, only physical laws can explain the effect.
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    • 2.The claim conflates Davidson's actual position (anomalous monism permits only physical strict laws) with what his argument logically requires.
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    • 3.Davidson arguably does exclude non-physical strict laws by endorsing physicalism and denying psychophysical laws are fundamental.
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    Causation1 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Davidson arguably does exclude non-physical strict laws by endorsing physicalism...Davidson never explicitly argues why causal efficacy requires events to fall und...Davidson's anomalous monism cannot move from 'mental events must instantiate non...Davidson's causal argument only establishes that mental events cause physical ef...
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    Davidson's exclusion argument assumes causal closure: if mental events cause phy...Non-reductive physicalism permits strict psychophysical laws governing mental-to...The claim conflates Davidson's actual position (anomalous monism permits only ph...

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    claim
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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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