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    Davidson's anomalous monism cannot move from 'mental even... — Carmelics
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    Davidson's anomalous monism cannot move from 'mental events must instantiate non-mental strict law properties' to 'those properties must be physical' without assuming causal closure of the physical

    CausationConsciousness & Mind
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Davidson's own argument in 'Mental Events' moves from causal interaction to strict law instantiation without providing resources to exclude non-physical strict laws.
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    • 2.Nomological dualism—strict psychophysical or sui generis mental laws—is conceptually coherent and consistent with Davidson's three premises, as Stoutland and Sosa both argue.
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    • 3.Therefore Davidson's conclusion that the instantiated strict law properties are specifically physical requires causal closure as an unstated fourth premise.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Papineau's work establishes that causal closure is an empirical-historical thesis, not derivable from conceptual analysis of causation or lawhood alone.
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    • 2.Davidson's explicit argumentative resources consist only of the Principle of Causal Interaction, Nomological Character of Causality, and Anomalism of the Mental—none of which entail causal closure.
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    • 3.Any valid derivation of physicalism about the instantiated strict properties therefore smuggles in an empirical premise that Davidson never acknowledges or defends within his framework.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Davidson's framework requires mental events to instantiate non-mental, strict law properties
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    • 2.The further claim that those strict law properties must be physical requires an additional premise
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    • 3.Causal closure of the physical is not independently derived within Davidson's own explicit resources
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    Consciousness & MindCausation

    Key Terms

    Davidson
    # Davidson Davidson most commonly refers to **Donald Davidson** (1917-2003), an influential American philosopher known for his work on the philosophy of mind and language. He developed important theories about how our thoughts connect to the physical world and how we understand meaning in language and communication. His ideas have shaped modern philosophy by challenging the view that the mind is completely separate from physical reality.
    Mental events(as used in philosophy of mind)
    Things that happen in your mind, like thoughts, sensations, or experiences.
    Physical properties(as used in philosophy of physics)
    Characteristics of objects that exist in the physical world, like mass, color, size, or temperature—things you could theoretically measure or observe.
    anomalous monism(Davidson's position distinguishing it from standard type identity theories)
    A form of token identity theory holding that mental events are identical to physical events, but mental descriptions do not participate in strict causal laws due to the anomalous (non-law-governed) nature of intentional predicates.
    causal closure of the physical(Raised as a problem for dualist or property-dualist views of qualia)
    The principle that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, leaving no explanatory gap for non-physical entities to causally intervene in the physical world.
    instantiate(as used in metaphysics)
    To be a concrete example of something, or to have and display a particular property or category.
    strict law properties(Davidson's anomalous monism)
    Properties that figure in exceptionless, non-hedged causal laws, as opposed to the hedged generalizations of special sciences

    Related

    Any valid derivation of physicalism about the instantiated strict properties the...Causal closure of the physical is not independently derived within Davidson's ow...Davidson's explicit argumentative resources consist only of the Principle of Cau...Davidson's framework requires mental events to instantiate non-mental, strict la...
    +5 moreShow less
    Davidson's own argument in 'Mental Events' moves from causal interaction to stri...Nomological dualism—strict psychophysical or sui generis mental laws—is conceptu...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: anomalous-monism
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    There are serious problems with the assumption of causal closure of the physical in Davidson’s framework (for discussion, see the supplement on Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism). It is difficult, however, to see how Davidson can move from the claim that mental events must instantiate non-mental, strict law properties to the claim that these properties must be physical without assuming closure. Why assume that only ‘physical’ properties are nomic? This raises
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Papineau's work establishes that causal closure is an empirical-historical thesi...
    The further claim that those strict law properties must be physical requires an ...
    Therefore Davidson's conclusion that the instantiated strict law properties are ...

    Similar

    Davidson's anomalous monism does not commit him to the possibility of ...88%Davidson's monism requires only that some physical description applies...86%Therefore, causally interacting mental events must instantiate some no...85%Therefore, the non-mental property that causally interacting mental ev...84%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit