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    Davidson's truth-theoretic semantics requires axioms that... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The Tarskian/Davidsonian approach to semantics is parsimonious compared to propositional semantic theories

    Davidson's truth-theoretic semantics requires axioms that pair expressions with extensions, but extensions (sets of possible satisfiers) implicitly invoke intensional distinctions to handle modal and attitude contexts.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Extensions defined by possible satisfiers cannot distinguish 'water' from 'H2O' across modal contexts without covertly using intensional criteria.
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    • 2.Attitude reports like 'Sam believes water is wet' require different truth conditions than 'Sam believes H2O is wet,' revealing extensionalism's hidden intensionality.
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    • 3.Davidson's axioms pair expressions with truth conditions, not bare extensions, implicitly smuggling in the intensional content they claim to avoid.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Extensions are simply sets of concrete or abstract objects; invoking them involves no intensional machinery beyond classical set theory.
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    • 2.Modal and attitude problems arise from scope ambiguity and context-shifting, not from extensional semantics being inherently intensional.
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    • 3.Davidson's truth conditions can be specified using only extensional resources if we properly separate object-language from metalanguage distinctions.
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    Key Terms

    Attitude contexts(another type of language that creates problems for simple theories of meaning)
    Sentences expressing beliefs, desires, hopes, or other mental states—for example, 'Sarah believes that water is H2O' involves an attitude.
    Davidson
    # Davidson Davidson most commonly refers to **Donald Davidson** (1917-2003), an influential American philosopher known for his work on the philosophy of mind and language. He developed important theories about how our thoughts connect to the physical world and how we understand meaning in language and communication. His ideas have shaped modern philosophy by challenging the view that the mind is completely separate from physical reality.
    Extensions(what FO allegedly cannot express according to the claim)
    In logic, the set of all things that a property actually applies to—for example, the extension of 'red things' is everything that is red.
    Modal contexts(as used in logic and metaphysics)
    Situations in sentences where you're talking about possibility, necessity, or what could/must/might happen (as opposed to just stating plain facts).
    Truth-theoretic semantics(Davidson's approach to explaining how language works)
    A theory of meaning that says understanding a word or sentence means knowing what would make it true or false.
    axioms(Stumpf, 1891)
    Propositions that we assume to be true and necessary, originating in the content of judgments.
    intensional(as used in logic and philosophy of language)
    Relating to meaning, context, or how something is described, rather than just what the thing is—for example, 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' refer to the same object (Venus) but intensionally they're different descriptions.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Attitude reports like 'Sam believes water is wet' require different truth condit...Davidson's axioms pair expressions with truth conditions, not bare extensions, i...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Davidson's truth conditions can be specified using only extensional resources if...
    Extensions are simply sets of concrete or abstract objects; invoking them involv...
    +3 moreShow less
    Extensions defined by possible satisfiers cannot distinguish 'water' from 'H2O' ...Modal and attitude problems arise from scope ambiguity and context-shifting, not...The Tarskian/Davidsonian approach to semantics is parsimonious compared to propo...