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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Davidson's truth-theoretic semantics requires axioms that pair expressions with extensions, but extensions (sets of possible satisfiers) implicitly invoke intensional distinctions to handle modal and attitude contexts.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Extensions are simply sets of concrete or abstract objects; invoking them involves no intensional machinery beyond classical set theory.
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    • 2.Modal and attitude problems arise from scope ambiguity and context-shifting, not from extensional semantics being inherently intensional.
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    • 3.Davidson's truth conditions can be specified using only extensional resources if we properly separate object-language from metalanguage distinctions.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Extensions defined by possible satisfiers cannot distinguish 'water' from 'H2O' across modal contexts without covertly using intensional criteria.
      ?

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    • 2.Attitude reports like 'Sam believes water is wet' require different truth conditions than 'Sam believes H2O is wet,' revealing extensionalism's hidden intensionality.
      ?

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    • 3.Davidson's axioms pair expressions with truth conditions, not bare extensions, implicitly smuggling in the intensional content they claim to avoid.
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