Dennett's intentional stance shows that representational states are not intrinsic properties but interpretive posits, undermining any principled distinction between 'basic' and 'intentional' agency.
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The particularly interesting and central kind of agency that the standard theory is primarily concerned with, which involves representational mental states
intentional stance(Dennett's terminology; used to explain how talk of 'persons' functions in folk psychology without committing to persons as metaphysically real entities)
A cognitive stance one adopts toward a system by treating it as if it has beliefs, desires, and intentions, without this stance corresponding to the system's intrinsic metaphysical properties
interpretive posits(what representational states actually are, according to Dennett)
Things we decide to assume or treat as real for practical purposes, even though they depend on our interpretation rather than existing objectively on their own.
intrinsic properties(Contrasted with structural properties revealed by physics)
Properties which supposedly underlie and account for the structural properties of things.
representational states(as what second-order volitions depend on)
Mental states that are *about* something—like thoughts, beliefs, or ideas that represent or point to things in the world.