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    The standard theory of agency is not too demanding, even ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    The standard theory of agency is not too demanding, even if some non-human beings capable of agency lack representational mental states

    Consciousness & MindMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The standard theory can be construed as providing an account of one particularly interesting and central kind of agency — intentional agency — rather than agency as such
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    • 2.On this construal, the standard theory is compatible with the existence of more basic kinds of agency that do not require representational mental states
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dennett's intentional stance shows that representational states are not intrinsic properties but interpretive posits, undermining any principled distinction between 'basic' and 'intentional' agency.
      ?

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    • 2.If representational mental states are merely heuristic attributions, then the standard theory's tiered account collapses into a single framework with no non-arbitrary boundary between agency kinds.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frankfurt's hierarchical account of agency requires second-order volitions, which presuppose representational states, making non-representational agency conceptually subordinate rather than genuinely continuous with full agency.
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    • 2.A theory that demotes non-representational agency to a 'more basic kind' systematically excludes it from the morally and practically significant domain the standard theory was designed to explain.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    A theory that demotes non-representational agency to a 'more basic kind' systema...Dennett's intentional stance shows that representational states are not intrinsi...Frankfurt's hierarchical account of agency requires second-order volitions, whic...If representational mental states are merely heuristic attributions, then the st...
    +2 moreShow less
    On this construal, the standard theory is compatible with the existence of more ...The standard theory can be construed as providing an account of one particularly...

    Similar

    On this construal, the standard theory is compatible with the existenc...87%The standard theory can be construed as providing an account of one pa...82%Ascribing representational mental states to non-human agents provides ...81%We are justified in ascribing representational mental states to non-hu...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: agency
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    Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is appropriate to ascribe representational mental states to non-human beings of various kinds. It may still be the case that there are other kinds of non-human beings that are capable of agency and that do not possess representational mental states. Would this show that the standard theory is too demanding? Only if the standard theory is construed as providing an account of agency as such. According to a less demanding view, the standard theory provides
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit