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    Denying the intrinsic reality of things at the convention... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Denying the intrinsic reality of things at the conventional level entails denying their conventional existence.

    Skepticism
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Conventional existence is constituted by things having intrinsic and unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa).
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    • 2.Removing the defining characteristic of a thing removes the basis for positing that thing's existence.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Candrakīrti distinguishes nominal existence (prajñapti-sat) from intrinsic existence (svabhāva-sat), such that the former requires no grounding in the latter.
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    • 2.Conventional things can exist dependently through causal efficacy and conceptual designation without possessing any intrinsic nature that underwrites their identity.
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    • 3.Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā explicitly argues that emptiness of intrinsic nature is itself the condition for dependent origination, not its negation.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dignāga's epistemology grounds conventional linguistic and cognitive practice in causal regularities (arthakriyā), not in intrinsically real particulars with fixed essences.
      ?

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    • 2.A thing's capacity to perform a function (arthakriyākāritva) can serve as the criterion for conventional existence independently of whether that thing possesses svalakṣaṇa in an intrinsically real sense.
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    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Modality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    A thing's capacity to perform a function (arthakriyākāritva) can serve as the cr...Candrakīrti distinguishes nominal existence (prajñapti-sat) from intrinsic exist...Conventional existence is constituted by things having intrinsic and unique part...Conventional things can exist dependently through causal efficacy and conceptual...
    +3 moreShow less
    Dignāga's epistemology grounds conventional linguistic and cognitive practice in...Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā explicitly argues that emptiness of intrinsic n...Removing the defining characteristic of a thing removes the basis for positing t...

    Similar

    If the defining characteristics of conventional reality are denied, th...89%A Mādhyamika who accepts conventional reality must also accept that th...87%Conventional reality always lacks any intrinsic reality, even conventi...86%Ultimate reality is tied to being that which is conventionally real.83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: twotruths-india
    View source passageHide passage
    Bhāvavevika’s second argument states that as long as a Mādhyamika accepts conventional reality it must also accept things as intrinsic in order to avoid the nihilism charge, for conventional reality is defined in terms of its being intrinsically and uniquely real (svalakṣaṇa). Denying intrinsic reality of things at the conventional level, would therefore entail the denial of their conventional existence, since it would entail the denial of the defining characteristics of the conventional reality
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit