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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Denying the intrinsic reality of things at the conventional level entails denying their conventional existence.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Candrakīrti distinguishes nominal existence (prajñapti-sat) from intrinsic existence (svabhāva-sat), such that the former requires no grounding in the latter.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Conventional things can exist dependently through causal efficacy and conceptual designation without possessing any intrinsic nature that underwrites their identity.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā explicitly argues that emptiness of intrinsic nature is itself the condition for dependent origination, not its negation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dignāga's epistemology grounds conventional linguistic and cognitive practice in causal regularities (arthakriyā), not in intrinsically real particulars with fixed essences.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A thing's capacity to perform a function (arthakriyākāritva) can serve as the criterion for conventional existence independently of whether that thing possesses svalakṣaṇa in an intrinsically real sense.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Conventional existence is constituted by things having intrinsic and unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Removing the defining characteristic of a thing removes the basis for positing that thing's existence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.