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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Descartes' argument from conceivability—that mind can be clearly conceived without body—does not establish real distinctness, since conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility, as Kripke's work on necessary a posteriori truths demonstrates.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's necessary a posteriori truths involve empirical discovery of essences; mind-body separability requires no empirical discovery.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Conceivability of disembodied mind differs from water-without-H2O: mind's properties seem intrinsically non-physical, not merely appearance.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The argument works on rational conceivability, not mere imaginability; rational coherence of dualism deserves metaphysical weight.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Water is conceivable as H2O-independent, yet necessarily is H2O; conceivability thus permits false metaphysical conclusions.
      ?

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    • 2.Epistemic conceivability (imaginability) tracks our knowledge limitations, not metaphysical possibility itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If conceivability established real distinctness, we'd wrongly infer consciousness could exist without any physical substrate whatsoever.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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