Destroying a physical inscription of a sentence does not void the belief that was expressed by that inscription (e.g., destroying a token of a sentence Seneca believed would not have voided Seneca's belief).
belief(Hume's account of causal inference, Treatise I.III.7–8)
An idea that is almost as vivid and forceful as the impression of which it was once a copy
token(Philosophy of language; type-token distinction)
An actual physical thing located at a specific place in spacetime; a concrete instantiation such as a pile of ink on a page, a sound wave, or a collection of pixels on a computer screen
void(Aristotle's definition, used as the basis for his argument against the existence of a void)
A natural analysis of such sentences is that they express a relation between Seneca or Columbus and the propositions that man is a rational animal or that the world is round, where such propositions are objective abstract entities that are the ultimate vehicles of truth and meaning. But there has been—and no doubt always will be—skepticism about the existence of such entities and this has motivated the view that sentences such as (1) and (2) express relations between agents and sentence types or