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    Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) provides a better a... — Carmelics
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    Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) provides a better account of attitudes than purely model-theoretic or purely sententialist approaches

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.DRT uses classical model-theoretic semantics of the DRS language to account for intentionality in terms of possible worlds
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    • 2.DRT retains a representational level that models resource-bounded computations in practical reasoning
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    • 3.Combining possible-worlds semantics with a representational level addresses both intentionality and the failure of logical omniscience
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.DRS structures are themselves abstract objects requiring a theory of how agents access and token them, reinvoking the original intentionality problem.
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    • 2.Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis shows that positing representational levels does not explain intentionality but merely relocates the explanatory burden.
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    • 3.DRT's combination of possible-worlds semantics and representations inherits the frame problem from both traditions without resolving it from either.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Stalnaker's possible-worlds treatment of belief already accommodates resource-bounded agents via centered worlds and self-locating belief without representational intermediaries.
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    • 2.Adding a representational level to model-theoretic semantics produces a hybrid that violates theoretical parsimony without demonstrably increasing explanatory power over refined single-framework accounts.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    Modality & Possibility2 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Adding a representational level to model-theoretic semantics produces a hybrid t...Combining possible-worlds semantics with a representational level addresses both...DRS structures are themselves abstract objects requiring a theory of how agents ...DRT retains a representational level that models resource-bounded computations i...
    +4 moreShow less
    DRT uses classical model-theoretic semantics of the DRS language to account for ...DRT's combination of possible-worlds semantics and representations inherits the ...Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis shows that positing representational leve...

    Similar

    A sententialist or Language-of-Thought approach alone is insufficient ...88%The Russellian view places a more reasonable constraint on proposition...81%A theory of reasoning can concern only explicit attitudes, since only ...79%Some fitting attitude theories aspire only to capture certain values r...77%

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    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: discourse-representation-theory
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    A central issue in the treatment of attitudes is that of logical omniscience: humans are cognitively limited agents, and are not aware of all the consequences of their beliefs and desires. On this basis, Kamp (1990) argues that the objects of thought should not be seen as purely model-theoretic entities, for example a set of belief worlds, as is common in logics of belief from Hintikka (1962) onwards. Rather, the logic of belief and other attitudes must involve structured mental representations.
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    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Stalnaker's possible-worlds treatment of belief already accommodates resource-bo...
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    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
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