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It is not the case that Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) provides a better account of attitudes than purely model-theoretic or purely sententialist approaches
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Reasons For
2 perspectives
Reason for 1 of 2
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1.
DRS structures are themselves abstract objects requiring a theory of how agents access and token them, reinvoking the original intentionality problem.
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2.
Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis shows that positing representational levels does not explain intentionality but merely relocates the explanatory burden.
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3.
DRT's combination of possible-worlds semantics and representations inherits the frame problem from both traditions without resolving it from either.
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Reason for 2 of 2
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1.
Stalnaker's possible-worlds treatment of belief already accommodates resource-bounded agents via centered worlds and self-locating belief without representational intermediaries.
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2.
Adding a representational level to model-theoretic semantics produces a hybrid that violates theoretical parsimony without demonstrably increasing explanatory power over refined single-framework accounts.
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Reasons Against
1 perspective
Reason against
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1.
DRT uses classical model-theoretic semantics of the DRS language to account for intentionality in terms of possible worlds
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2.
DRT retains a representational level that models resource-bounded computations in practical reasoning
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3.
Combining possible-worlds semantics with a representational level addresses both intentionality and the failure of logical omniscience
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