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    Disjunctive properties are not genuine properties but mer... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Disjunctivism accommodates requisite determination

    Disjunctive properties are not genuine properties but merely nominal groupings, as Armstrong argued in 'Universals and Scientific Realism'.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Disjunctive properties like 'red or square' lack causal powers—nothing explains why being red-or-square causes specific effects.
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    • 2.Natural laws reference only non-disjunctive properties; disjunctions never appear as fundamental forces in physics.
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    • 3.Grouping arbitrary objects by disjunction is a cognitive convenience, not a discovery of nature's structure.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Negative properties like 'not-blue' are disjunctive yet seem genuinely causally relevant to perception and discrimination.
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    • 2.Mathematical properties (e.g., 'prime or even') are disjunctive but appear essential to scientific explanation and ontology.
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    • 3.Armstrong's criterion conflates nomological fundamentality with genuineness; a property can be real without appearing in basic laws.
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    Causation1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Armstrong's criterion conflates nomological fundamentality with genuineness; a p...Disjunctive properties like 'red or square' lack causal powers—nothing explains ...Disjunctivism accommodates requisite determinationGrouping arbitrary objects by disjunction is a cognitive convenience, not a disc...
    +3 moreShow less
    Mathematical properties (e.g., 'prime or even') are disjunctive but appear essen...Natural laws reference only non-disjunctive properties; disjunctions never appea...Negative properties like 'not-blue' are disjunctive yet seem genuinely causally ...

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    claim
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