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Inverse View
It is not the case that Disjunctive properties are not genuine properties but merely nominal groupings, as Armstrong argued in 'Universals and Scientific Realism'.
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Reasons For
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1.
Negative properties like 'not-blue' are disjunctive yet seem genuinely causally relevant to perception and discrimination.
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2.
Mathematical properties (e.g., 'prime or even') are disjunctive but appear essential to scientific explanation and ontology.
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3.
Armstrong's criterion conflates nomological fundamentality with genuineness; a property can be real without appearing in basic laws.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Disjunctive properties like 'red or square' lack causal powers—nothing explains why being red-or-square causes specific effects.
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2.
Natural laws reference only non-disjunctive properties; disjunctions never appear as fundamental forces in physics.
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3.
Grouping arbitrary objects by disjunction is a cognitive convenience, not a discovery of nature's structure.
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