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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Disjunctivist accounts (McDowell, Hinton) demonstrate that veridical perception and hallucination are fundamentally different states, not unified by a common internal factor.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Disjunctivism struggles to explain introspective access: hallucinating subjects cannot introspectively detect the absence of real objects.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Evolution shaped perception and hallucination through similar neural mechanisms, suggesting a common internal representational structure underlies both.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The unity of perceptual science requires treating perception and hallucination as continuous states differing in causal origin, not fundamental kind.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Veridical perception involves direct mind-independent objects; hallucination involves no such objects. This ontological difference is fundamental.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If perception and hallucination shared a common internal factor, we couldn't explain why perception reliably tracks reality while hallucination doesn't.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Phenomenal indistinguishability doesn't entail metaphysical similarity; identical experiences can arise from fundamentally different causal relations.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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