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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    Dissenters can be morally blameworthy even if they cannot... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Dissenters can be morally blameworthy even if they cannot control the system that implicates them in evil.

    Justice & PunishmentMoral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Moral blameworthiness need not require that the blameworthy individual control the actions or harms for which they are blamed.
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    • 2.Moral blameworthiness can be located in the greater community of which the individual is a part, rather than in the will of the discrete individual.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Moral blameworthiness requires some form of control or authorship over the act or omission in question, as Kant and Frankfurt both argue.
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    • 2.A dissenter who actively opposes a system exercises no authorship over that system's harmful outputs.
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    • 3.Blaming dissenters for outcomes they neither endorsed nor could alter conflates causal involvement with moral agency.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Strawson's reactive attitudes ground blame in the quality of an agent's will directed toward others, not in group membership.
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    • 2.A dissenter's will is oriented against the collective evil, making resentment or indignation toward them a category error under Strawsonian ethics.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityJustice & Punishment

    Related

    A dissenter who actively opposes a system exercises no authorship over that syst...A dissenter's will is oriented against the collective evil, making resentment or...Blaming dissenters for outcomes they neither endorsed nor could alter conflates ...Moral blameworthiness can be located in the greater community of which the indiv...
    +3 moreShow less
    Moral blameworthiness need not require that the blameworthy individual control t...Moral blameworthiness requires some form of control or authorship over the act o...Strawson's reactive attitudes ground blame in the quality of an agent's will dir...

    Similar

    Collective responsibility can attach to individuals who lack control o...87%Moral blameworthiness need not require that the blameworthy individual...82%Groups can be held morally responsible for harm even if they are not g...82%We cannot be truly or ultimately morally responsible for our actions.82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: collective-responsibility
    View source passageHide passage
    Raikka claims in this context that dissenters can be morally blameworthy even if they cannot control the system that implicates them in evil. Hence, he finds it necessary to do two things that not only place him squarely in the camp of Karl Jaspers and other advocates of metaphysical guilt but that are very telling with respect to contemporary philosophical debates about collective responsibility in general. The first is to subtract from the set of conventionally invoked criteria of collective r
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit