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    Doxastic and epistemic models can be related through brid... — Carmelics
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    Doxastic and epistemic models can be related through bridge principles linking knowledge and belief

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Knowing something implies believing it
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    • 2.If an agent believes φ then the agent knows that the agent believes φ
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    • 3.Both informational attitudes share a common formal structure differing only in the reflexivity vs. seriality condition
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Knowledge requires justification or reliability conditions that belief lacks, making their formal structures irreducibly heterogeneous.
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    • 2.Gettier cases demonstrate that justified true belief fails to constitute knowledge, so no reflexivity-to-seriality bridge can capture the real epistemic gap.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology treats knowledge as primitive and belief as a derivative, weakened form, inverting the bridge-principle dependency direction.
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    • 2.If belief is defined as 'treating as if one knows' (Williamson 2000), then belief presupposes knowledge conceptually, making symmetric bridge principles circular.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Key Terms

    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Skepticism2 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Both informational attitudes share a common formal structure differing only in t...Gettier cases demonstrate that justified true belief fails to constitute knowled...If an agent believes φ then the agent knows that the agent believes φIf belief is defined as 'treating as if one knows' (Williamson 2000), then belie...
    +3 moreShow less
    Knowing something implies believing itKnowledge requires justification or reliability conditions that belief lacks, ma...Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology treats knowledge as primitive and beli...

    Similar

    The relevant epistemic relation is belief.82%False models serve a legitimate epistemic function in science80%Standard epistemic-logic closure principles for knowledge lead to conc...79%Standard epistemic logics such as S4 and S5 are implausible as models ...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: epistemic-game
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    So far we have looked at relational models of hard information. A small modification of these models allows us to model a softer informational attitude. Indeed, by simply replacing the assumption of reflexivity of the relation \(\sim_i\) with seriality (for each state \(w\) there is a state \(v\) such that \(w\sim_i v\)), but keeping the other aspects of the model the same, we can capture what epistemic logicians have called “beliefs”. Formally, a doxastic model is a tuple \(\langle W, \{R_i\}_{
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit