Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Eliminativist and identity-theory traditions (Place, Smar... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→Thinking cannot be fundamentally understood as a spatial process

    Eliminativist and identity-theory traditions (Place, Smart, Armstrong) give us strong empirical and ontological reasons to reject a non-spatial res cogitans.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Mental states correlate perfectly with brain states; neuroscience finds no causal gaps requiring non-spatial explanation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Non-spatial substances violate conservation laws of physics and create intractable interaction problems with the body.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Parsimony favors one ontology (matter) over two; spatial physicalism requires fewer primitive entities than dualism.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Neural correlates of consciousness exist, but correlation doesn't entail identity or that consciousness is purely physical.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.First-person subjective experience (qualia) resists reduction to third-person physical descriptions; explanatory gap remains.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Identity theory assumes physicalism rather than proving it; the claim begs the question against dualist metaphysics.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    First-person subjective experience (qualia) resists reduction to third-person ph...Identity theory assumes physicalism rather than proving it; the claim begs the q...Mental states correlate perfectly with brain states; neuroscience finds no causa...Neural correlates of consciousness exist, but correlation doesn't entail identit...
    +3 moreShow less
    Non-spatial substances violate conservation laws of physics and create intractab...Parsimony favors one ontology (matter) over two; spatial physicalism requires fe...Thinking cannot be fundamentally understood as a spatial process

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit