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    Elite defection signals exploit information asymmetries; ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→A preference for cooperation that cannot survive minimal defection signals from elites was never a robust cooperative preference in the game-theoretic sense.

    Elite defection signals exploit information asymmetries; populations responding to them reveal conditional rather than intrinsic cooperative commitments.

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    A preference for cooperation that cannot survive minimal defection signals from ...

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    A preference for cooperation that cannot survive minimal defection signals from ...

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