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    A preference for cooperation that cannot survive minimal ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The Yugoslavian and Rwandan disasters were not initially Prisoner's Dilemmas; most people on either side did not begin by preferring the destruction of the other group to mutual cooperation.

    A preference for cooperation that cannot survive minimal defection signals from elites was never a robust cooperative preference in the game-theoretic sense.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Robust preferences in game theory require stability under strategic variation; preferences collapsing at minimal defection signals fail this criterion.
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    • 2.Elite defection signals exploit information asymmetries; populations responding to them reveal conditional rather than intrinsic cooperative commitments.
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    • 3.Empirically, cooperation sustained only by norm-enforcement collapses when enforcement capacity weakens, indicating preference fragility not robustness.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Rational responsiveness to elite defection signals is adaptive, not a sign of weak preferences; robust players update beliefs with new information.
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    • 2.Game-theoretic robustness concerns fixed strategy stability, not preference persistence under norm-erosion; these are distinct analytical categories.
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    • 3.Preferences can be genuine yet context-dependent; collapsing under extreme conditions doesn't negate real cooperative motivation under normal conditions.
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    Democracy & Governance1 linkedJustice & Punishment1 linked

    Related

    Elite defection signals exploit information asymmetries; populations responding ...Empirically, cooperation sustained only by norm-enforcement collapses when enfor...Game-theoretic robustness concerns fixed strategy stability, not preference pers...Preferences can be genuine yet context-dependent; collapsing under extreme condi...
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    Rational responsiveness to elite defection signals is adaptive, not a sign of we...Robust preferences in game theory require stability under strategic variation; p...The Yugoslavian and Rwandan disasters were not initially Prisoner's Dilemmas; mo...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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