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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Equal moral status can be grounded in the all-or-nothing ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Equal moral status can be grounded in the all-or-nothing capacity for reflective self-authorship even if individuals exercise this capacity to varying degrees in practice.

    Moral ResponsibilityRights & Liberty
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The capacity for reflective self-authorship is an all-or-nothing capacity rather than one that admits of degrees.
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    • 2.What grounds equal status is possession of the capacity, not the degree to which it is exercised.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The threshold for possessing the capacity for reflective self-authorship is itself a matter of degree, not a binary fact about persons.
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    • 2.If the capacity admits of degrees below the threshold, the choice of threshold is arbitrary and cannot ground equal status without independent justification.
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    • 3.An arbitrary threshold cannot do the normative work of grounding equal moral status without collapsing into the degree-based view it was meant to replace.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant's Formula of Humanity grounds dignity in rational nature as an end, but Korsgaard and Parfit show this generates scalar, not binary, attributions of moral status.
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    • 2.If the philosophical tradition most committed to capacity-based equal status actually entails gradations, the all-or-nothing claim lacks its strongest historical support.
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    Moral ResponsibilityRights & Liberty

    Related

    An arbitrary threshold cannot do the normative work of grounding equal moral sta...If the capacity admits of degrees below the threshold, the choice of threshold i...If the philosophical tradition most committed to capacity-based equal status act...Kant's Formula of Humanity grounds dignity in rational nature as an end, but Kor...
    +3 moreShow less
    The capacity for reflective self-authorship is an all-or-nothing capacity rather...The threshold for possessing the capacity for reflective self-authorship is itse...What grounds equal status is possession of the capacity, not the degree to which...

    Similar

    Equal moral status cannot be grounded in reflective capacity alone, be...89%This capacity for reflective self-authorship is all-or-nothing rather ...86%The capacity for reflective self-authorship is an all-or-nothing capac...85%If moral status is grounded in a capacity that varies among individual...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: autonomy-moral
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    The answer may be that our normative commitments do not arise from our actual capacities to reflect and to choose (though we must have such capacities to some minimal degree), but rather from the way in which we must view ourselves as having these capacities. We give special weight to our own present and past decisions, so that we continue on with projects and plans we make because (all other things being equal) we made them, they are ours, at least when we do them after some reflective delibera
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit